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ABSTRACT 
The non-directional overcurrent protection (International Electrotechnical Commission 
standard IEC 617 or American National Standards Institute ANSI/Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers IEEE C37.2 standard device number 51) is one protection 
type/relay function that has stood the test of time. The latest generation of relays has 
brought about enhanced capabilities. The most popular overcurrent protection, which 
is the Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) function, has proven to provide 
coordination of electrical nodes with ease. This is one of the oldest but extremely 
reliable relay characteristic. 
A number of new protection functions and enhancements to existing functions are 
commensurate to the advanced technical capabilities of the newer generation protective 
devices. The new development techniques include “acceleration”, which is a technique 
of sending the circuit breaker status of the near end of a line or feeder to the far end to 
influence the relay decision at the far end. Impedance protection, unit line protection, 
etc. have come with many advanced characteristics and properties.  The enhancements 
to protection devices bear special features but cannot substitute inverse time overcurrent 
protection, which, up to now, is a reliable backup in feeder protection schemes in South 
Africa.  The superior feature is the capability to achieve coordination between a series 
of protective devices.  This is achievable without excessive damage to the electrical 
components of the circuit.  
 The dissertation presents the application of the IDMT IEC standard inverse curve to 
achieve a reliable protection in the event of both a three-phase bolted fault and a single 
phase to ground (SLG) fault.  It is essential to first treat the different overcurrent 
functions that are in use, for example, the instantaneous overcurrent and high set 
overcurrent protection (I>> device number 50) in order to accentuate the advantages of 
applying inverse time overcurrent (I>) to achieve effective coordination in series 
connected protective devices.  More importantly, this research treats series parallel 
networks / mesh networks, which provide complexities in respect of coordination 
between series connected devices.  To achieve the necessary selectivity, the use of 
directional element (IEC/ANSI device number 67) is explored and it is advocated for 
such networks.  The marshalling of relay device 67 is meticulously done to prevent 
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nuisance operations and to achieve a high level of selectivity and reliability of circuit 
breaker operation. 
Distributed generation (DG), topology changes, changes in operating mode of the 
network, impedance changes, etc. is likely to cause a bidirectional flow of power in a 
micro-grid system.  The bidirectional flow of power is a complexity that is resolved by 
methodically fashioning the tripping logic of an intelligent electronic device (IED) relay 
to achieve a dependable operation. 
The mesh power networks under investigation in the upcoming case studies all have 
important features of interest to this research. The features include bi-directional power 
flow and parallel paths for power flow, which may “confuse’ the relay and cause it to 
make a wrong decision. 
The networks build in a power simulator aggregates the possible complex features 
mentioned.  The solutions provided, as presented in this dissertation, apply the features 
of directionality, the settings groups and selectivity of protection operation. This 
research further proves through experiments that, without such features, a mal-
operation of protection is experienced; such mal-operations are sympathetic tripping 
and incorrect coordination of protection tripping. 
  
 Page | iv  
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
My sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr Ali Hasan for guidance and support 
throughout my research.  It has been a mammoth task, but he showed dedication to the 
course and generosity to share information and experience beyond measure. 
To God be the glory! He gives me courage and hope, and makes a way where there 
seems to be none. 
To my wife and children, I stole your time to work on this research.  I owe you.  Thanks 
a lot! 
To my former colleagues at the Power Utility, MJ, PTMash, Siya and David.  Thank 
you guys for sharing your knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Page | v  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................viii 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND  ACRONYMS ................................................. xi 
PUBLICATIONS ......................................................................................................xiii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1 
1.1 General View into the State of Security of Supply ..................................... 1 
1.2 Short Circuits ................................................................................................. 2 
1.3 Overcurrent Protection ................................................................................. 4 
1.4 Micro-grid System ......................................................................................... 7 
1.5 Protection Objective ...................................................................................... 8 
1.6 Fault Detection ............................................................................................... 9 
1.7 Coordination, Discrimination and Fault Isolation ..................................... 9 
1.8 Problem Statement ...................................................................................... 11 
1.9 Research Objectives .................................................................................... 12 
1.10 Methodology ................................................................................................ 13 
1.11 Synopsis of the Dissertation ........................................................................ 14 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................. 15 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 15 
2.2 Defining Key Concepts ................................................................................ 15 
2.3 Reliable Power System ................................................................................ 17 
2.4 Adaptive Protection Concept and Overcurrent Protection ..................... 18 
2.5 Instantaneous Type Protection .................................................................. 20 
2.6 Adaptive Relays ........................................................................................... 20 
 Page | vi  
 
2.7 Smart Energy Management and the IoT .................................................. 21 
2.8 IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging ................................................................... 22 
2.9 Topology Changes ....................................................................................... 22 
2.10 Distributed Generation (DG) ..................................................................... 24 
2.11 Operating Mode Change ............................................................................ 24 
2.12 Effect of Line Impedance Load Changes in Fault Currents ................... 25 
2.13 Multiple Settings Groups ............................................................................ 27 
2.14 Directional Relay Marshalling Problem ................................................... 27 
2.15 Research Focus ............................................................................................ 28 
2.16 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 3: CASE STUDY 1: COMPARISON BETWEEN DEFINITE TIME 
AND INVERSE TIME OVERCURRENT .............................................................. 30 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 30 
3.2 Experiment Setup ........................................................................................ 30 
3.3 Relay settings ............................................................................................... 32 
3.4 Discussion of Results: Fault Levels and Characteristic Curves .............. 40 
3.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 42 
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY 2: THREE PHASE BOLTED FAULT IN A 
MESH NETWORK ................................................................................................... 43 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 43 
4.2 Experiment Setup ........................................................................................ 43 
4.3 System Modelling ........................................................................................ 48 
4.4 Fault Simulations Under Steady State ...................................................... 49 
4.5 Dynamic Analysis ........................................................................................ 50 
4.6 Discussion of Results ................................................................................... 51 
4.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 52 
 Page | vii  
 
CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY 3: OVERCURRENT PROTECTION 
PHILOSOPHY USING MICROPROCESSOR BASED RELAYS FOR SLG 
FAULT 53 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 53 
5.2 System Modelling ........................................................................................ 53 
5.3 Experiment Setup ........................................................................................ 54 
5.4 Experiment Setup ........................................................................................ 55 
5.5 Discussion of Results ................................................................................... 57 
5.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 63 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 65 
6.1 Conclusions .................................................................................................. 65 
6.2 Recommendations ....................................................................................... 67 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 68 
 
  
 Page | viii  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Sequence Network for SLG fault [18] ........................................................... 3 
Figure 2: Different types of IDMT Curves [23] ............................................................ 5 
Figure 3: A series network of power nodes ................................................................... 6 
Figure 4: IDMT Overcurrent Grading ........................................................................... 7 
Figure 5: A Micro-grid diagram [32] ............................................................................. 8 
Figure 6: Inverse Time Characteristic [23] .................................................................. 10 
Figure 7: Mixed Curves for overcurrent Protection [23] ............................................. 19 
Figure 8: Adaptive Relaying Co-ordination Algorithm [20] ....................................... 20 
Figure 9: Secondary Selective ‘Main-Tie-Main’ Arrangement [73] ........................... 22 
Figure 10: Main-Tie-Tie-Main Arrangement and Main-Main Arrangement [73] ....... 23 
Figure 11: Ring Bus Arrangement [73] ....................................................................... 23 
Figure 12: Modes of Operation Changes [76] ............................................................. 25 
Figure 13: Effect of System Impedance on the Fault Levels [75]. .............................. 26 
Figure 14: Quadrature method for determining the direction of a fault [76] ............... 28 
Figure 15: Series network for this case study .............................................................. 32 
Figure 16: Grading Curves depicting both IDMT and Definite Time O/C ................. 42 
Figure 17: The discrimination problem in a series network. ....................................... 44 
Figure 18: Discrimination problem in a mesh network [85] ........................................ 44 
Figure 19: Inclusion of DG in a mesh network ............................................................ 45 
Figure 20: Network used in the experiment ................................................................. 46 
Figure 21: Time graded curves for dynamic simulations ............................................ 50 
Figure 22: Time graded curves for dynamic simulations ............................................ 52 
Figure 23:Microprocessor Relay Tripping Logic ........................................................ 55 
Figure 24: The network under discussion .................................................................... 56 
Figure 25: Line currents during the SLG Fault ............................................................ 57 
 Page | ix  
 
Figure 26: Line voltages during fault ........................................................................... 58 
Figure 27: A-phase current during fault at MTA = 0° ................................................. 60 
Figure 28: B-phase current during a fault at MTA = 0° .............................................. 61 
Figure 29: C-phase current during a fault at MTA =0° ............................................... 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page | x  
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Different Circuit permutations and the respective fault levels. ..................... 27 
Table 2: Fault Levels at Substation 1 ........................................................................... 33 
Table 3: Transformer information at Substation 1 ....................................................... 33 
Table 4:Actual Relay Settings applied to the relay at Substation 1 ............................. 33 
Table 5:  Fault Levels at substation 2 .......................................................................... 37 
Table 6: Actual Settings applied to the relay at Substation 2 ...................................... 37 
Table 7: Fault Levels at Substation 3 ........................................................................... 39 
Table 8: Actual Settings applied to the relay at substation 3 ....................................... 39 
Table 9: Network Parameters ....................................................................................... 47 
Table 10: CT Ratio, VT Ratio and Relay Type ........................................................... 47 
Table 11: Settings for Incomer to each substation ....................................................... 48 
Table 12: Logic Inputs to the relay Sub C incomer ..................................................... 51 
Table 13: Experimental results .................................................................................... 57 
Table 14: Truth table for tripping decisions. ............................................................... 62 
Table 15: Experiments Results Summary .................................................................... 66 
 
  
 Page | xi  
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND  ACRONYMS 
 
IDMT    Inverse Definite Minimum Time 
OC     Overcurrent 
IED     Intelligent Electronic Device 
kVA    kilo Volt Amp 
FLC    Full Load Current 
PS     Plug Setting 
PSM     Plug Setting Multiple 
CDG Current operated Induction Disk Generator – A Generl 
Electric relay model 
I>    Inverse Time overcurrent 
I>>     High Set or Instantaneous Overcurrent 
pu    pick-up 
SLG     Single Line to ground 
DG     Distributed Generation 
IPP    Independent Power Producers 
MW    Mega Watt 
CT Current Transformer 
VT     Voltage Transformer 
SI      Standard Inverse 
CTR     CT Ratio 
EHV     Extra High voltage 
HV     High Voltage 
MTA    Maximum Torque Angle 
IoT    Internet of Things 
 Page | xii  
 
GOOSE   Generic Object Oriented Substation Event 
RTA     Relay Torque Angle 
VPOL     Polarising voltage 
MVA     Mega Volt Amperes 
IEC    International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE    Institute of Electrical and electronic Engineers 
Z1    Positive Sequence Impedance 
Phi Z1    Phase angle of the positive sequence impedance  
MCCB    Miniature Circuit Breaker 
LV    Low Voltage (< 1000 V) 
MV    Medium Voltage (> 1000 V but < 22 kV) 
kA    Kilo Amps 
STC    Short time Current 
RMS    Root Mean Square 
kV    Kilo Volts 
PCC    Point of Common Coupling 
SLG    Single Line to Ground 
SI    Standard Inverse 
5P10 Protection current transformer has 5% error at 10 times 
nominal current. 
10P10 Protection current transformer has 5% error at 10 times 
nominal current. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page | xiii  
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
A. Published Conference Papers 
 
1.  Hasan, AN and LV Dlamini (2018). “Proposed Adaptive Overcurrent Protective 
Relaying In A Reliable Micro-grid System.”  In SAUPEC. University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, January 2018. Johannesburg: SAIEE.  
 
B. Submitted Conference Papers 
 
2. Ali N. Hasan and Linda Dlamini, “Overcurrent Protection Philosophy Using 
Microprocessor Based Relays For a South African Power Distribution Network”  
In IEEE Power Africa Conference, 2019, Nigeria. 
 
 
 
  
 Page | 1  
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General View into the State of Security of Supply 
The world power demand is expected to grow by 1.7% per year until the year 2030. South 
Africa, as a developing country, has also experienced an increase in demand [1]. This 
necessitates, among others things, optimisation of energy usage, a usage plan for demand-side 
management and reliability in the operating of the power utility service [2, 3].  Reliability as 
a continuum has dependability at one end and security of supply at the opposing end [4]. 
Security of supply objective is of utmost importance to the user of electricity.  It is important 
because any power disruption results in loss of supply, which could have a devastating effect 
on the operations of some of the major businesses, utilities and hospitals.  A power cut incident 
in India in 2001 bears the example of an unbearable chaos when there is a power cut [5]. 
Dependability of supply is of interest to the power utility as it ensures that a fault in the power 
system is cleared dependably, without fail, in order to protect the power plant from possible 
damage [4]. 
The vast power distribution networks in South Africa, which comprise primarily the state 
power utility company, Eskom, and a small component of municipalities and private 
distribution networks, contain a multitude of different electrical protection systems.  A great 
amount of work has been done in upgrading the networks to the newer generation relays but 
there are still some remnants old generation relays, especially in private networks and in 
municipalities.  Municipalities account for 43% of the volume of electricity sales and the state 
of their infrastructure is described as deteriorated, with growth in loading and without 
correlating network upgrades [6]. 
As a result of the above, the network has aged and it is in a terrible state of maintenance.  The 
drive is to strike a balance between the two ends of the reliability spectrum, security of supply 
and dependability of supply respectively. As a consequence, all unnecessary power 
interruptions need to be eliminated, hence the need to investigate possible protection mal-
operations [7]. 
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The benefit of adopting a new philosophy into protection settings application is that whenever 
there is a fault in a ring system, the correct breakers should isolate the fault.  The relays 
protecting the unaffected areas must block the incorrect trip.  This is the contribution of the 
study to the body of knowledge [4]. 
 
1.2 Short Circuits 
Short circuits in a power system are very dangerous because they may result in extremely high 
currents.  As a result, precision in the detection of currents and a short fault clearing time as is 
consistent with the magnitude of the fault current level are required for the power system [8].  
Two of the possible fault types are investigated in this research, and these are: 
a) Symmetrical three phase faults are the most severe faults or the heaviest form of short 
circuiting [9] [10]and 
b) Phase to ground fault are the most common faults [8] [10]. 
Three Phase Symmetrical Faults 
The common terminology of a ‘bolted’ fault means that the fault has zero impedance to earth.  
This is an important consideration because as the fault impedance increases, the fault current 
diminishes [11]. 
In the case of a line, the impedance is used in fault calculations.  Low voltage lines take into 
consideration the resistance of the line, whereas the high voltage lines (11 kV and above) only 
consider the line reactance which is inductive in nature.  In case of rotating machines, we 
consider the transient reactance (Xd’) in the fault calculations [10] [12]. 
Unsymmetrical Faults - Single Phase to Ground Fault 
To analyse unsymmetrical faults, the method of symmetrical components is used. The most 
common of all the short circuit faults is single line to ground faults (SLG).  For an unloaded 
synchronous generator with a neutral grounded through an impedance ZN [13]. In phase 
domain the conditions as described in (1) exist, whereby the B and C- phase currents are non-
existent, while the A-phase current is high as in (2). 
Ib = Ic = 0       (1) 
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and  
VAG = ZFIA  [14] [15]       (2) 
 
When (1) and (2) are transformed to the sequence domain, they become (3) and (4): 
(
𝐈a0
𝑰𝑎1
𝑰𝑎2
) = 1/3 (
1 1 1
1 𝑎 a2
1 𝑎2 𝑎
) (
𝑰𝑎
0
0
)       (3) [16] 
and  
(V0 + V1 + V2) = ZF (I0 + I1 + I2)      (4) 
This brings us to the concept of sequence networks, and (3) shows that all three-sequence 
currents are equal.  The sequence network is shown in Figure 1 [17]. 
To satisfy (3) and (4), the sequence networks must be connected in series as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Sequence Network for SLG fault [18] 
From the sequence network in figure 1, the positive sequence current (I1), the negative 
sequence current (I2) and the zero sequence network (I0) are all equal as shown in (5). 
I1 = I2 = I0         (5) 
The fault is in the A-phase and the A-phase sequence currents are as shown in (6) where the 
positive sequence, negative sequence and zer-sequence currents are all equal to one another. 
Ia1 = Ia2 = Ia0               (6) 
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The resultant equation for fault current is: 
𝑰𝑓 = 𝑰𝑎 = 𝟑𝑰𝑎0 =
3𝑬𝑎
𝑍0+𝑍1+𝑍2+3 𝑍𝑓
      (7)  [15] 
From this discussion, it can be concluded that the unaffected phases will have no current 
flowing through them, while the faulted phase will have a high current.  Equation (7) shows 
the fault current represented in terms the sequence currents, the fault impedance (Zf) and the 
A-phase emf (EA).  A specific case study of SLG shall be outlined in Chapter 5 where there is 
bidirectional flow of current. 
 
1.3 Overcurrent Protection 
Combinations of protection philosophies, types, functions and characteristics as applied in 
power systems are too numerous to count.  Protection against excess current, for example, 
overload and overcurrent protection, were some of the earliest protection systems to evolve 
[19]. Overcurrent protection is a type of protection that was developed for the purpose of 
protecting against excess current [20]. It is not an overload protection, although it does offer 
some measure of overload protection with the settings that are usually adopted [19]. 
Overcurrent protection is renowned for the important characteristics of selectivity, reliability 
and discrimination [21]. 
When applied to series connected feeders, there has to be a number of overcurrent relays that 
coordinate with one another so that the relay closest to a fault operates first.  Therefore, only 
faulted sections of the network must be isolated during a fault [22]. 
Overcurrent protection can be divided into the following different types: 
 Instantaneous overcurrent, IEEE 37.2 device number 50; 
a) Definite time overcurrent, IEEE 37.2 device number 50; 
b) Inverse Time Overcurrent, IEEE 37.2 device number 51; 
c) Directional Overcurrent, IEEE 37.2 device number 67 [22]. 
It is not a coincidence that we apply the same device number for both instantaneous and 
definite time overcurrent.  They are similar in the sense that both are defined by the current, 
the time setting in modern relays could either be 0 seconds (or anything close to 0 seconds) 
and definite time is also a much lower time setting as seen in Figure 2 [22]. 
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The three different types of Inverse Time Overcurrent, referred to as Inverse Definite 
Minimum Time (IDMT) overcurrent are: 
a) Normal Inverse, 
b) Very Inverse, and  
c) Extreme Inverse [22]. 
The characteristic curves are plotted relative to one another in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Different types of IDMT Curves [23] 
In a ploy to achieve grading with fuses, which are incidentally, the cheapest means of 
protection and most commonly applied at consumer level overcurrent protection is often 
applied.  It normally works as a backup to instantaneous protection types, such as. impedance 
protection and unit line differential protection. These are differential in nature and they are 
applied in transformers, busbar protection and line protection, and are always set to operate 
instantaneously but will not operate for a fault out of their zone of protection [24] [25] [26] 
[27].  This necessitates the application of overcurrent protection as a backup to provide reliable 
operation of protection in a series network where coordination is of importance [4, 28]. 
Overcurrent protection coordination in a series network works better when grading is by both 
current and time.  This is a concept of inverse time overcurrent.  It has an inverse time 
relationship and it is called Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) function or characteristic.  
This effectively means that the higher the fault current, the quicker the operating time of a 
relay [2] [29]. 
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Figure 3 shows a series network with 4 series substations or nodes denoted Sub A to Sub D.  
Load could be connected at any of the nodes (Sub A to D) and protection coordination is 
essential.  For a fault F1 at Sub D, only the circuit breaker at Sub D is supposed to trip on 
IDMT. 
 
Figure 3: A series network of power nodes 
The corresponding trip curves for IDMT overcurrent are supposed to grade in such a way that 
the circuit breaker at Sub D should be the quickest to operate. If it fails, C should operate as 
backup and so on [19]. The grading margin between them is dealt with in section 1.5.  Figure 
3 shows the grading curves for the different series substations.  
The Time Multiplier Setting (TMS) determines the “speed” of the IDMT curve.  The lower 
the TMS, the faster the curve, hence the lowest curve in the set is the fastest and the closest to 
the fault under investigation.  This set of curves show grading with time and current [19]. 
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Figure 4: IDMT Overcurrent Grading 
1.4 Micro-grid System 
In South Africa, electricity supply has been an exclusive domain of the state power utility, 
Eskom.  Eskom supplies about 35000 MW of power in South Africa, while Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) account for only 2000 MW [7]. IPPs provide an opportunity for entrepreneurs 
and local residents to produce their own power and, through grid-tie agreements, be able to 
connect to the power utility grid [30].This is the idea of a localised grid, equipped with local 
control and it is called a micro-grid system. A micro-grid system is meant to be more 
dependable as it can operate in an island mode, whereby it is completely isolated from the 
main power grid or even export power back into the grid [7, 19] [31].  There has been 
accelerated improvements in performance and cost of energy storage, and this makes micro-
grid systems more attractive [32]. 
A typical micro-grid system is as portrayed in Figure 5  A micro-grid is connected to a utility 
grid but can also work autonomously.  It generally connects distributed generators and loads 
[21] [33].  In a system such as this, power flows in both directions to and from the power grid, 
as well as to and from the power storage. 
In some applications, differential protection relays are applied at specific areas of a micro-grid.  
The differential relays are protecting the specific zone of application and will not operate for 
a fault outside of the zone [34].  This strengthens the case for applying O/C as a backup.  
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Figure 5: A Micro-grid diagram [32] 
 
1.5 Protection Objective 
When a fault condition arises in a power system, the faulted element must be isolated.  This 
has to happen reliably. Furthermore, it must be selective, sensitive and must operate with 
speed. These are the objectives of electrical protection.  Reliability is of the utmost importance, 
not neglecting of course, the essentiality of the others. Reliability is the focus of this research 
study as it pertains to grading and speed of operation of protection, hence dependability and 
security of supply. It is important because relays and circuit breakers are installed to act upon 
the occurrence of a fault in a power system, that is, should a fault occur, protection is expected 
to operate; and it must act reliably without fail. It must act correctly, selectively, dependably 
and with speed. It becomes an even bigger challenge to achieve the protection objectives when 
variables such as a grid-tie system, a smart grid, a micro grid, co-generation and tri-generation 
are introduced into the equation – the operational characteristics of a distribution grid.  More 
sophisticated tools and improved technological capabilities provide protection and control 
enhancements needed to cope with the latest developments [35]. 
What is key in power system protection is the detection of faults and the subsequent clearance 
thereof.  These are achieved through a number of specialised hardware.  The hardware 
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equipment includes circuit breakers, current transformers, voltage transformers and relays 
[36]. 
 
1.6 Fault Detection 
The interface between the relay measuring element and the primary plant is achieved through 
instrument transformers, current transformers (CTs) and voltage transformers (VTs).  The CTs 
and VTs provide the three currents and the three voltages of a three phase system respectively.  
The choice of CT ratios is based on the primary service current given as follows in (8). 
IPS=
S
(√3 US)
       (8) 
Where:  
S = Apparent Power in Volt Amperes (VA), 
US = Service Voltage in Volts, 
And IPS = Primary Service Current in Amps 
A typical example: In an 8 MVA, 11 kV system, one would typically apply an 800/1 CT ratio 
[35].   
 
1.7 Coordination, Discrimination and Fault Isolation 
This study treats the Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) function and considers only the 
standard inverse (SI) curve as given by equation (2).  The IDMT curves are plotted in a log-
log graph, or semi-log graphs as it is common practice to respond to the “skewness” towards 
large values of fault currents.  The curves are obviously hyperbolic in shape, asymptotic to the 
current and the time axis as shown in Figure 6.  This is to depict the inverse proportionality 
between the trip time and the fault current [19]. 
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Figure 6: Inverse Time Characteristic [23] 
Depending on the magnitude of the overcurrent fault, the fault may be detected by more than 
one element upstream from the fault, but its isolation should be performed by the element 
closest to the fault.  That is the principle of proper protection co-ordination.  Depending on the 
Plug Setting (PS), the other elements upstream from the fault will show a “start” or pick-up 
indication on the Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) relay to indicate that a fault was detected 
[19].The trip time for a standard inverse curve is given by equation (9):  
Required Trip Time=
0.14×Time Multiplier
((
Fault Current 
Plug Setting*Ct Ratio
)
0.02
-1)
      (9) 
CT Ratio (CTR) is normally selected to be close to the Full load current (FLC).  Therefore, if 
we apply (10). 
𝐶𝑇𝑅 = 𝐹𝐿𝐶        (10) 
Equation (10) can be represented as in (11). 
Required Trip Time=
0.14×Time Multiplier
((
Fault Current 
Plug Setting*FLC
)
0.02
-1)
      (11) 
Correct coordination prevents a mal-operation (or mis-coordination) of protection. Equation 
(9), (10) and (11) are applied in the calculations of trip time for Standard Inverse IDMT 
overcurrent. 
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1.8 Problem Statement 
The introduction of embedded generation into a utility grid brings about problems of mis-
coordination of protection.  This is caused by the bi-directional flow of power, that is, power 
flowing from either end of the point of consumption.  The static set of protection settings, 
specified for the standard vertical network, may coordinate well when there is no embedded 
generation. The introduction of embedded generation at the distribution level introduces 
undesirable mal-operations of protection coordination [37]. To this end, mis-coordination of 
protection happens when the element that is supposed to trip and isolate the fault fails to do 
so; instead, another element farther from the fault operates. Similarly, when the element that 
is not affected by the fault sympathetically operates [38]. 
With the use of the new generation of protective relays, we aim to have adaptive protective 
relaying so that whenever a change in the configuration of the primary plant is implemented, 
the secondary plant devices respond by automatically changing the protective relay settings.  
This necessitates automatic migration from one settings group to another. Furthermore, there 
is a need for selective isolation that ensures that security of supply is maintained in the areas 
of the network that are not faulted.  The case study in Chapter 5 treats the adaptive overcurrent 
relaying by applying a logic that ensures that the direction of the overcurrent fault is not 
misjudged by the numerical relay. 
Algorithms for integrated adaptive instantaneous overcurrent and adaptive undervoltage have 
been developed for use in low voltage systems.  This is meant to address the shortcomings of 
applying either one on its own [39]. This fails to address the coordination problem between a 
series nodes of a power system. 
Although we term this adaptive protective relaying application, it is sometimes discrete in form 
rather than continuous.  The aim is to develop one or two groups of settings corresponding to 
each of the possible network configurations and to be able to juggle between these groups of 
settings in response to the changes in the mode of operation or system configuration.  This is 
done to cater for the three phase bolted fault in a mesh network and to meticulously fashion 
settings that will ensure that the direction decision is correct in the case of single line to ground 
fault. 
Without the desired adaptivity, each time the distributed generator (DG) is put online, the 
protection settings have to be inserted manually.  This could be a tedious exercise which can 
open up an opportunity to make an error which may impose a risk of protection mis-operation.  
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We intend having this process happening automatically in a smart grid by using intelligent 
devices that are able to communicate their statuses among one another and to take instructions. 
Justification for this research was founded on the basis that in the current situation, there is no 
known standard that dictates the correct approach to the application of protection settings, 
particularly at distribution level, to counteract the effect of mis-coordination caused by DG.  
The treatment of inverse time overcurrent, typically the IDMT overcurrent, which is widely 
applied is therefore well befitting, given the need to have a reliable network as regards to 
dependability and security of power supply.   
The Eskom standard on Protection Settings Philosophy for EHV and HV networks asserts that 
protection settings are supposed to meet the system and customer requirements, and that leaves 
the decision to the operator of the network as well as the customer to make the necessary 
detailed specifications [40]. 
 
1.9 Research Objectives 
The aim of this research is to establish selectivity when applying overcurrent protection by 
making the overcurrent function more adaptable to the state of dual direction of power flow 
resulting from the connection of Distributed Generation (DG) at the point of consumption. The 
objective is twofold, dependability – ensuring the fault is dependably isolated and security of 
supply – ensuring that an incorrect trip is prevented.  
Firstly, the type of overcurrent protection is investigated, high set or inverse time with a view 
to establish the most suitable arrangement that offers proper coordination in a mesh network 
(series-parallel).  Secondly, the dependability problem is investigated with respect to a three 
phase bolted fault by comparing an application with non-directional overcurrent and one with 
directional current, and demonstrating that the breakers that are supposed to trip do indeed trip.  
Thirdly, a full demonstration of the directional overcurrent concept is performed with a single 
line to ground (SLG) fault on a 132 kV system ensuring proper selectivity that ensures security 
of supply to areas not affected by the fault. 
The study was performed using DigSilent Power factory 2018 by working out the fault levels, 
configuring the instrument transformers (Current transformers and Voltage Transformers), as 
well as a microprocessor based relay type ABB REF615 relay.  Suitable relay settings were 
manually calculated.  IDMT overcurrent protection was selected and the desired grading 
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margin as applied in the calculations is 0.4s.  The choice thereof as a simulation tool is justified 
on the basis of it being highly respected and widely used in the power utility, Eskom.  
 
1.10 Methodology 
This research is an experimental research that seeks to determine a reliable operation of 
overcurrent protection in a micro-grid system by varying the protection settings and/or 
migrating from one group of settings to another.  The outcome is the same, selective 
coordination, when there is supervision over the measured quantities and/or while the settings 
groups are varied.   
Positivism 
As this is scientific research, it follows the positivism philosophy, which claims that the reality 
is stable and can be observed and described from an objective viewpoint. The three case studies 
aim at proving selective coordination of overcurrent protection at a certain fault current and 
fault position while varying the direction and polarisation component to ensure we achieve 
reliable results.  The grading and characteristic curves, as defined by the time multiplier and 
current pick-up settings, remain the same in the experiments being performed. The choice of 
directional or non-directional power flow is exercised in one case study and the choice of a 
polarising component and supervision in another [41]. 
Quantitative Analysis 
This research seeks to use quantitative analytical techniques to observe the reality in terms of 
quantification and objectivity to make conclusions that are generalisable, that, indeed the 
selective protection (Dependent variable) is achievable with adaptive protection.  With 
directional overcurrent protection, the desired reliability is realisable when logic controls are 
applied to optimise the application of numerical relays in the automation of relay decisions.  
Similarly, for a single line to ground fault, the usual polarising components that are applied 
may not be sufficient and the problem is overcome by applying supervision components that 
are not real but computational. 
Adopted Methodology 
In this research, adaptive overcurrent protection is investigated by examining the different 
types of overcurrent protection as applied in electricity user networks.  We go on to examine 
the concept of adaptability and to treat three different cases where mis-operation of protection 
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is experienced with the use of basic IDMT overcurrent.  With simulations, solutions are 
provided for each of the cases being examined.  
 
1.11 Synopsis of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 introduces protection types for power systems, that is, protection types that are 
widely used as instantaneous protection.  These protection types are outlined in a form of 
literature review by explaining their applicability and effectiveness. An opinion is adopted that 
IDMT overcurrent is a backup protection for some of the instantaneous protection types.  The 
shortfalls in instantaneous protection types are examined and the choice of IDMT curve, 
standard inverse (SI curve) is also discussed. 
Chapter 3 presents the comparison between the different types of overcurrent protection, 
instantaneous/high set, definite time and IDMT.  The requirement for protection coordination 
is emphasised in the application of IDMT.  
Chapter 4 presents the treatment of a three phase bolted fault as a case study.  Directional 
overcurrent is introduced and the benefits explored in terms of security of supply. 
Chapter 5 presents a protection problem in a case study, whereby an SLG fault occurs and 
directional overcurrent protection completely misjudges it, resulting in incorrect protective 
relaying decision.  A logical solution is formulated with the use of a supervision current 
element. 
Chapter 6 concludes the study with a summary of results and the recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the use of overcurrent protection as a backup to other instantaneous 
protection types and as a means to achieve coordinated operation of circuit breakers for a series 
network.  A Literature Survey is conducted on the application of electrical protection in general 
and IDMT overcurrent in particular in a mesh network. 
 
2.2  Defining Key Concepts 
In this section the key concepts or variables relevant to the study are defined: 
Smart Grid 
An electricity grid as “a network of synchronised power providers that are connected by 
transmission and distribution lines and operated by one or more control centres”. This suggests 
that for the electricity grid to be smart, the actions of all the users and the generators and those 
that do both (user and generator roles) must be intelligently integrated, in order to efficiently 
deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies [42]. 
Smart grid technologies are those technologies aimed at improving reliability, flexibility, 
accessibility and profitability, as well as supporting renewable energy initiatives in an electricity 
grid [43]. 
The electrical grid is, therefore, generally “dumb” or without intelligence.  The introduction of 
monitoring and control using computer intelligence makes it “smart”.  Monitoring and control 
are the major proponents and a critical part of the future smart grid power system [44]. 
Micro-grid 
A micro-grid system is described as a system consisting of energy consumption and generation 
in an interconnected fashion at a distribution level. These can operate in an island mode (off-
grid) or in a connected mode, whereby local generation is connected to the utilities grid [45]. 
A micro-grid is essentially a subset variation of a smart grid whereby local power generation 
(Distributed Generation – DG) or embedded generation using solar, gas generation or any 
renewable form of energy generation is applied.  This generation occurs on-site at consumption 
points [46]. 
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Grid-tie 
Grid tying is when small-scale renewable electricity generators connect to the utility power 
grid as power producers. [47] This implies that locally generated power is tied to the grid or 
imported into the mains electrical grid. These are sometimes referred to as distributed 
generation (DG) [48] [49]. 
Embedded Generation 
Similar to grid-tie, this refers to independent small generation plants that are grid-tied.  These 
includes photovoltaic power generation and other renewable forms of power generation such 
as photovoltaic (PV), wind and gas generation [50]. 
Adaptive Relaying 
Adaptive protection is defined as “an online activity that modifies the preferred protective 
response to a change in system conditions or requirements in a timely manner by means of 
externally generated signals or control action” [48]. This implies that the protection scheme 
has a capability to change protection settings in response to the change in the power system 
parameters [51]. 
Adaptive Overcurrent Relaying 
Adaptive Overcurrent Relaying is overcurrent protection which is adaptive. Overcurrent 
protection is normally referred to as phase overcurrent protection.  Phase overcurrent 
protection is applied on line protection as an alternative to a fuse.  It is meant to minimise 
equipment damage and enhance coordination. Therefore, it limits outage time and voltage dip 
duration [52]. The pick-up relay setting for this protection is always higher than the full-load 
current [52]. 
The focus of the research is on positive phase sequence overcurrent as opposed to negative 
phase sequence due to the nature of common short circuit faults.  Negative phase sequence 
overcurrent does not respond to balanced load and so it can have an insignificantly low pick-
up setting as opposed to the normal (or positive phase sequence) phase overcurrent protection 
[53]. Therefore, negative phase sequence overcurrent is not very popular in distribution 
systems under consideration in this study [53]. 
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It is purported that instantaneous overcurrent protection “makes a reduction in tripping time 
and improves the overall system grading by allowing the discrimination curves behind it to be 
lowered” [53] [20]. This protection is sometimes referred to as “High Set” overcurrent 
protection and it operates well when the source impedance is small in comparison with the 
circuit impedance [53].  This is the case when the faster curve is lowered and the subsequent 
curves can also be lowered [53]. 
Directional Overcurrent protection is the overcurrent protection that has a directional power 
flow element [54]. This type of overcurrent relaying is applied when the selectivity can be 
achieved by directional relaying [54]. This feature allows the relay to operate for faults in one 
direction only. It can be time-overcurrent or instantaneous in nature [54]. 
Phase Overcurrent under consideration applies the Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) 
characteristic.  For simplicity, the study does not mix the different IDMT characteristics. There 
are three types of IDMT characteristics that are widely used in the power utility in South 
Africa. These are: Standard (or normal) Inverse; Very Inverse and Extremely Inverse.  This 
study focuses on Standard Inverse as it is the most widely used [55]. 
 
2.3  Reliable Power System 
When a fault condition arises in a power system, the faulted element must be isolated.  This 
has to happen reliably. Furthermore, it must be selective; sensitive and must operate with 
speed. These are said to be the objectives of electrical protection. Reliability is of the utmost 
importance; not neglecting of course, the essentiality of the others. Reliability is the focus of 
this research study. It is important because relays and circuit breakers are installed to act in a 
power system upon the occurrence of a fault and prevent damage to equipment. Should a fault 
occur, protection is expected to operate; and it must act reliably and without fail. It must act 
correctly, selectively, dependably and with speed to minimize of a short circuit. [56] It 
becomes even more challenging to achieve the protection objectives when variables such as a 
grid-tie system, a smart grid, a micro grid and co-generation are introduced into the equation. 
The listed variables are explained below [56]. 
 
Reliability is described as having the two extremes in its spectrum: dependability and security. 
The consumers would prefer to have a secure power supply and the utility supplier would 
prefer to operate a dependable power system.  These two cannot be provided consistently at 
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the same time – not with the traditional way of configuring our vertically integrated power 
systems protection.  Dependability, as one extreme in the reliability spectrum, will allow the 
disconnection of power system components, transformers, feeders, etc. to allow for effective 
isolation of a faulted element.  Security, as the other extreme, will tend to be more selective in 
nature, isolating only the intended area and generally being more tolerant to prevailing fault 
conditions as it tends to avoid initiating an incorrect trip. There is a trade-off here; a dependable 
protection scheme will assuredly prevent damage – it is prone to unnecessary operation which 
can lead to cascading outages. The security aspect on the other end will expose the equipment 
to a risk of damage due to it being  “fault tolerant” in nature [55]. 
Morden power systems operate close to their security limits, therefore, high speed of operation 
is required to prevent damage to equipment, to prevent system instability and to maximize 
safety. [57] This is why the integrity of protection is so important in a power system. This 
warrants a closer look at how, without compromising dependability or security of the power 
supply, protection is to be applied in a modern system [57]. 
 
2.4  Adaptive Protection Concept and Overcurrent Protection 
It is asserted that many relays are adaptive to a limited extent, referring to many protection 
functions as it were. [58] A good example is (IDMT) overcurrent and earth fault, which adapts 
its trip time to the current level. The IDMT function was applied in electromechanical relays, 
for example, the CDG11, CDG16 and CDG36 relays, and carried over to the subsequent 
generations of relays, the solid state and furthermore to numerical relays and IEDs (Intelligent 
Electronic Devices). This makes it one of the first in adaptive type protection, yet, in its 
original form, it has limitations of its own [59].   
Figure 7 depicts the different overcurrent characteristics as shall be dealt with in detail in 
chapter 3. 
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Figure 7: Mixed Curves for overcurrent Protection [23] 
One limitation in the development and application of protection of relay settings is that relay 
settings are developed offline and are invariably in operating [59]. This poses a challenge when 
the changes mentioned above are introduced in the power system. To this end, much effort has 
been put into making traditional protection functions adaptive by using intelligent devises and 
having advanced control circuitry. A control circuit or input logic is what makes a difference 
between current adaptive protection and traditional current protection [60]. 
During online operation, the central controller monitors the grid breaker statuses and uses the 
event and action tables to configure the relays appropriately.  This is achieved through 
effective and fast communication from the IEDs to the controller [60].  When a comparison is 
done between the hard wiring and the GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Event) 
messaging using the IEC 61850 standard, it is concluded that the permissive overreach transfer 
trip communication speed with IEC 61850 is faster than using hard wiring [60]. 
When applied to overcurrent protection, adaptive protection dynamically determines the pick-
up current and time multiplier. This requires continuous real-time scanning and simulations of 
the power system to reconfigure the protection settings. This helps ensure timeous update of 
the system information [51]. 
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Figure 8: Adaptive Relaying Co-ordination Algorithm [20] 
2.5 Instantaneous Type Protection 
Various types of protection types operate instantaneously and as earlier mentioned, inverse 
time overcurrent protection acts as back-up for those various protection types.  The 
instantaneous protection types could be any of the following: 
a) Differential protection, 
b) Impedance protection,  
c) Buszone protection, etc. [7, 48, 52, 61]. 
 
2.6 Adaptive Relays 
The dilemma posed by the two ends of the reliability spectrum can only be resolved by having 
more dynamism in protection schemes [7].  Adaptive protection is defined as the ability of the 
protection system to automatically alter its operating parameters in response to changing 
power system conditions, to provide reliable relaying decisions. Changes that require 
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adaptability are topology changes, for example, Distributed Generation (DG), operating mode 
change and line impedance load changes. This chapter addresses these changes and 
demonstrates the relaying decisions that are necessary [62]. 
A nouvelle configuration mechanism called the source concept provides for adaptivity in the 
application of IEDs.  What it effectively means is that, whereas in the past there were single 
function relays with separate analog and binary inputs, the new applications use the same set 
of inputs to accomplish the different protection functions.  This was an important development 
towards adaptive protection [63]. 
 
2.7  Smart Energy Management and the IoT 
The capabilities of IEDs are vast and superior to its predecessors. These include 
communication among devices, communication to the control centre and interoperability 
among one another.  These capabilities can be exploited by using the Internet of Things (IoT) 
innovation.  IoT has been in use in Building Management and more research is done in this 
area of application [64, 65]. The same innovation can be applied to a smart grid to achieve 
some level of automation of energy management [65]. 
Energy management in a smart grid or micro-grid systems requires monitoring and control of 
when the embedded generation shall export power into the grid and when it shall operate in 
islanded mode [66]. Smart grids and similarly micro-grids are self-sufficient systems that find 
quick solutions for sustainable, reliable, safe and quality electricity to the consumer. Such 
monitoring and control are nowhere close to full implementation in many countries, and South 
Africa is no exception. This is evident with poor performing power utility network [65, 67].  
Smart grid technologies are the inevitable future and a massive transformation from the current 
situation.  The concept comes with new technologies and systems that have potential to affect 
the way utilities conduct their business, choose their technologies and structure their processes. 
[55, 33]  This research does not focus on the use of information about the loading to optimise 
production and distribution of electricity as intended in a smart grid; however, it is concerned 
about reliability with DG and ease of integration into the traditional grid [33]. 
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2.8  IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging 
Communication starts from a relay device responding to an applied setting.  The applied relay 
setting can be viewed as a command to the IED relay device based on the power system 
conditions or a prediction of system conditions such as equipment failures or fault conditions 
that require certain action to be taken.  The actions taken include the operation of circuit 
breakers and other equipment [68]. 
Gereric Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messaging are mechanisms for 
distributing status information in a substation [69]. These are normally circuit breaker and 
isolator statuses as binary inputs, as well as start and trip signals. The application of GOOSE 
messaging is limited to within a substation [69] [70] [71]. 
 
2.9  Topology Changes 
A number of topologies are in use in power systems.  The main ones that illustrate the point 
under discussion (the effect in the fault levels) are the following: 
a) Secondary Selective ‘Main-Tie-Main’ arrangement: Two bus arrangement on the 
secondary or load connection point coupled by a bus coupler.  Each bus is capable of 
carrying the entire load. (See Figure 9) 
b) Main-Tie-Main Topology: Main-Tie-Main arrangement and Main-Main arrangement, 
shown in Figure 10, are some of the popular arrangements. 
c) Ring Bus Arrangement: As shown in Figure 11.  This arrangement is common at 
medium voltage levels [72]. 
 
Figure 9: Secondary Selective ‘Main-Tie-Main’ Arrangement [73] 
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Figure 10: Main-Tie-Tie-Main Arrangement and Main-Main Arrangement [73] 
 
Figure 11: Ring Bus Arrangement [73] 
Figure 9, 10, 11 symbols are as follows: 
    -     Isolator 
 -  Fused isolator 
 -  Transformer 
 -  Circuit Breaker 
 -  Dead end feeder 
 - Load 
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2.10 Distributed Generation (DG) 
As at April 2016, the 102 Independent Power Producers have been procured by the South 
African Power Utility Company – Eskom, to the value of 6400 MW [74]. It is a clear indication 
of the extent to which DG has penetrated the power utility in South Africa.  To this end, the 
conditions for interconnection to the Eskom grid have remained rudimentary, so has the 
protection settings philosophies [75, 73]. 
Penetration of IPPs in South Africa stands at 139556 installations, accounting for 285 MW 
peak of electrical power [30]. To this end, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA) distribution network code stipulates only four conditions for co-generation:  
a) Voltage Regulation – to guard against overvoltage,  
b) Power Quality constraints – to limit frequency variations,  
c) Combined short circuit contributions not to exceed the network design value and  
d) It is to be equipped with phase and earth fault protection [37, 64]. 
 
2.11 Operating Mode Change 
A distributed generator can either operate in a standalone mode, islanded mode or parallel with 
the utility operation. As shown in Figure 12, these modes can be varied by opening or closing 
any of the circuit breakers [76] [77]. An enhanced adaptive bus protection is essential when 
there is more than one generator connected to the bus [78]. 
Standalone mode 
Only load circuit breaker and any of the generator circuit breakers is closed while the utility 
supply Point of Common Coupling (PCC) stays open [78]. 
Islanded mode 
The generator circuit breakers are closed while the PCC circuit breaker is open, while the loads 
are open [78]. 
In parallel with utility operation 
The generator circuit breakers for the three generators are closed and the PCC circuit breakers 
are also closed [78]. 
The modes of operation explained above are interchangeable, and the protection settings in a 
micro-grid are supposed to adapt to the changes.  
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Figure 12: Modes of Operation Changes [76] 
 
2.12 Effect of Line Impedance Load Changes in Fault Currents 
Simple computations of fault levels, as shall be illustrated, show that a simple change in the 
circuit impedance, for example, addition or elimination of a transformer into the network, 
addition or elimination of a line in a dual feeder network, result in a change in impedance 
which has a direct impact on the fault levels [75]. 
The following illustration depicts a system with two transformers paralleled: a 3MVA and a 
4MVA transformers supplied by a single 18.75MVA generator.  For the purpose of fault 
calculations, these components are represented by their impedances [75]. 
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18.75 MVA generator supplying 2 
transformers in parallel. (Use base 10 
MVA) 
 
Impedance Diagram 
 
 
 Equivalent Circuit 
 
Equivalent Impedance 
Figure 13: Effect of System Impedance on the Fault Levels [75]. 
Considering different permutations of the circuit, Table 1 shows the different possible fault 
levels. 
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Table 1: Different Circuit permutations and the respective fault levels. 
Circuit Arrangement Total Impedance Fault Level 
3MVA//4MVA in circuit 0.219 Ὠ 45.7 MVA 
Only 3 MVA in circuit 0.333 Ὠ 30.03 MVA 
Only 4 MVA in circuit 0.283 Ὠ 35.33 MVA 
 
2.13 Multiple Settings Groups 
Relay settings parameterisation or migration of relay settings from one group to another can 
be done locally on the relay or remotely by control signals from a control centre.  Numerical 
relays have that functionality – a number of groups of settings and a capability to migrate from 
one group to another  [51]. 
To summarise, adaptive protection systems are able to monitor and update the relays’ settings 
in accordance with distribution network or micro-grid state, based on offline analysis and 
online operation. 
 
2.14 Directional Relay Marshalling Problem 
IEEE 37.2 device 67 is able to circumvent most of the problems relating to bi-directional flow 
of current.  The method used to detect the direction of current flow is the quadrature method 
[55]. 
The IED has a standard marshalling matrix that has to be fashioned for directional faults.  
The quadrature method of detecting the direction of the fault is widely applied in protective 
relays and it operates as depicted in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Quadrature method for determining the direction of a fault [76] 
Maximum Torque angle (MTA) or sometimes referred to as Relay Characteristic Angle (RCA) 
is the angle by which the applied voltage must be displaced to produce maximum sensitivity; 
this is meant to centre the relay characteristic [76]. 
Vpol is a fictive voltage and it is meant to be a “memory” voltage, fictive in the sense that it 
is not real but an imaginary quantity defined to give direction reference.  It is set to last for a 
certain duration of time – the validity period of the fictive Vpol.  This time setting is the longest 
expected operating time for a three phase bolted fault [76]. 
 
2.15 Research Focus 
This research focuses on the application of adaptive IDMT overcurrent protection system with 
a normal/standard inverse characteristic to effect reliability in the tripping regime of a micro-
grid system.  This requires a closer look at the following variables: 
a) The time multiplier setting, 
b) Grading margins, and  
c) Logic input to the IED to effect adaptability. 
 
2.16 Conclusion 
There are benefits to applying overcurrent protection with and without adaptive reviewing of 
protection settings. [79] The benefit to applying adaptive protective relaying is that it provides 
more versatility in terms of applying DG in a micro-grid and changing the topology without 
fear of sympathetic tripping or a compromised dependability of a power system. [38]  At the 
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same time, the chance of losing supply to unaffected areas when there is no adaptive protection 
is not entirely a bad thing from the perspective of the utility supply aiming to operate with 
precaution to protect the plant and equipment. 
Many authors concur with the view that protection will operate reliably if it is adaptable.  The 
relationship between adaptive overcurrent relaying, as a case in point (independent/predicting 
variable) and a reliable micro-grid system (dependant/predicted variable) is achieved through 
the application of intelligent electronic devices (IED relays), a control centre and a fast and 
effective communication between the IEDs and control centre. 
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Chapter 3: CASE STUDY 1: COMPARISON BETWEEN 
DEFINITE TIME AND INVERSE TIME OVERCURRENT 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter introduces overcurrent protection in general terms, and provides specific 
justification for the application of IDMT overcurrent protection for the purpose of selective 
coordination in a series network.  This is done by comparing definite time with inverse time 
IDMT, in response to a three phase bolted fault.  For this purpose, a series network was selected 
for the study of load flows as well as fault levels. 
The different types of overcurrent protection were discussed in the previous chapter. This  
chapter focuses only on illustrating the superiority of inverse overcurrent protection over the 
definite time overcurrent in respect of discrimination and tripping coordination. 
 
3.2  Experiment Setup 
This experiment is based on a real-life network at a power station.  The air-conditioning supply 
network consists of different boards, designated as substation 1, 2 and 3, where substation 1 is 
the upstream substation that consists of a 15/0.42 kV transformer feeder. 
The true settings were calculated based on the IEC/ ANSI standard inverse curve for IDMT 
overcurrent.  The network and the corresponding relays were built on Powerfactory 2018 
according to the relay settings in 3.3.  After proving the network to be stable by checking the 
loads in the different sections of the network, fault levels were determined at the three series 
substations as indicated in section 3.3. 
The next step was to to calculate the settings for both definite time (High set I>>) and IDMT 
overcurrent (I>).   
The aim of protection settings is to get the fastest possible fault clearance with suitable grading 
to allow only the affected plant to be isolated correctly. The selection of protection functions 
in the newer more sophisticated protection schemes is informed by the need for coordination 
of protection tripping in a series network [80] [81]. The following points were considered in 
this setting document: 
a) The approach used was a bottom-up grading. 
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b) Normal IDMT Inverse curves were used.  
c) All IDMT over current functions allow grading with downstream protection and cater 
for high impedance faults. 
d) In this experiment, grading margins between 150 – 250ms were allowed since 
numerical or microprocessor based relays are used. This would take care of breaker 
operating times and any relay and CT tolerances. 
e) The downstream circuits are protected by the moulded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) 
and, in the worst case, they will clear the faults in less than 30ms, provided that the 
fault current exceeds the current pickup setting of the MCCB (Normally set between 
10 and 15 times the rated current). On the incomer, the time delay for the high set 
overcurrent trip can therefore be set to 50ms. The advantage of a shorter time is the 
reduction in arc energy, hence a more comfortable PPE requirement. 
f) No grading margins are required between the feeder side (e.g., MV) and the incomer 
side (LV) of a circuit. 
g) Settings calculations approach is a science and an art, in the sense that the scientific 
approach used is not rigid.  There is flexibility to customise the settings to meet the 
requirements for correct discrimination and grading in a series of electrical nodes. 
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Figure 15: Series network for this case study 
 
3.3 Relay settings 
The microprocessor relay type ABB REF630 used in this experiment for the transformer feeder 
to Substation 1, Feeder to substation 2 and 3 used Siemens 7SJ64 relays. The fault levels were 
calculated using Power factory 2018.  Manual calculations were dealt with in 2.10 and three-
phase bolted faults as well as SLG faults shall be dealt with in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
The resultant relay settings for all three substations are outlined below.  For the IDMT trip 
time, the IEC equation, equation (12) was applied. 
 
Required Trip Time=
0.14×Time Multiplier
((
Fault Current 
Plug Setting*FLC
)
0.02
-1)
       (12) 
Transformer Feeder 
2000kVA 
15/0.42 kV 
Z = 6.25 %  
 
7SJ647 
7SJ64 
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Substation 1 Settings 
Relay Type: ABB REF630 
Table 2: Fault Levels at Substation 1 
Fault Levels 
3 Phase Fault Current 44.252 KA 
 
1 Phase Fault Current 46.165 kA 
 
 
Table 3: Transformer information at Substation 1 
TRANSFORMER INFORMATION   
Transformer rating 2000 kVA 
 
Vector Group DyN11 
 
Rated Voltage 15/0.42 kV 
 
 
 
HV Rated Current 76.98 A 
 
LV Rated Current 2749.29 A 
 
Transformer Impedance 6.25% 
 
 
Table 4:Actual Relay Settings applied to the relay at Substation 1 
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (PHLPTOC: 1) 
         
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (PHLPTOC) is used for 
single-phase, two-phase and three-phase non-directional overcurrent and 
short-circuit protection.  
         
Operation 
Set to On 
      
         
FLC 
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Base value selector phase, phase to phase 
   
Set to Phase Grp 1 
      
         
Phase current measurement mode of function 
  
Set to  DFT 
      
         
Number of start phases 
      
Set to 1 out of 3 
      
 
  
      
Curve parameter A - Parameter A for customer programmable curve 
Set to  28.2000 
      
         
Curve parameter B - Parameter A for customer programmable curve 
Set to  0.1217 
      
         
Curve parameter C - Parameter A for customer programmable curve 
Set to  2.00 
      
         
Curve parameter D - Parameter A for customer programmable curve 
Set to  29.10 
      
         
Curve parameter E - Parameter A for customer programmable curve 
Set to  1.00 
      
         
Reset delay time - Delay time provided to reset the timers 
Set to 0.02 
      
         
Minimum operate time - Minimum operate time delay for IDMT curves 
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Set to  0.04 
      
         
Start value  
This overcurrent protection shall be set  to 150% to 200% of the highest 
prospective load current.  
Set to 1.500 
  
 
   
         
Start value multiplier - Multiplier for scaling the start value 
 
Set to 1 
      
         
Time Multiplier - Time multiplier in IEC / ANSI curves.  
Set to 0.1 
  
 
   
         
Operating curve type - Selection of time delay curve type 
 
Set to IEC Norm. Inv. 
      
         
Type of reset curve 
       
Set to Immediate 
      
         
Operate delay time 
       
Set to 0.269 s 
      
         
 
         
Three-phase non-directional overcurrent protection: Instantaneous stage 
(PHIPTOC: 1) 
 
  
      
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (PHIPTOC) is used for 
single-phase, two-phase and three-phase non-directional overcurrent and 
TM 
PS 
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short-circuit protection. The instantaneous stage PHIPTOC always operates 
with the DT characteristic. 
         
Operation 
Set to On 
      
Base value selector phase, phase to phase 
   
Set to Phase Grp 1 
      
         
Number of start phases 
      
Set to 1 out of 3 
      
         
Reset delay time - Delay time provided to reset the timers 
Set to 0.02 
         
Start value.  This overcurrent protection shall be set  to < 0.5 pu of the 
prospective fault current.  
Set to 22126.0 
      
         
Start value multiplier - Multiplier for scaling the start value 
 
Set to 1 
      
 
  
      
Operate delay time 
       
Set to 0.2 s 
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Substation 2 Settings 
Relay Type: SIEMENS 7SJ64 
Table 5:  Fault Levels at substation 2 
3 Phase Fault Current on 
420V 
45.653 kA 
 
1 Phase Fault Current on 
420V 
21.164 kA  
 
 
Incomer Cable Rating 2.980 kA  
  
Table 6: Actual Settings applied to the relay at Substation 2 
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (IDMT Ph) 
          
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (IDMT Ph) is used for 
single-phase, two-phase and three-phase non-directional overcurrent and 
short-circuit protection.  
          
The (IDMT Ph) non-directional overcurrent protection shall be set to 105% to 
120% of the full load current. 
          
Ip 
Pickup 
         
Set to 1.120 
   
 
   
          
T IEp Time Dial 
Set to 0.080 
   
 
   
 
  
       
PS 
TM 
FLC 
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Trip 
Time 
         
Set to 0.214 seconds 
    
          
IEC 
Curve 
Set to Normal Inverse 
       
 
  
       
Three-phase non-directional overcurrent protection: Instantaneous stage (DMT 
Ph) 
 
  
       
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (DMT Ph) is used for single-
phase, two-phase and three-phase non-directional overcurrent and short-circuit 
protection. The instantaneous stage (DMT Ph) always operates with the DT 
characteristic. 
          
This overcurrent protection shall be set  to < 0,5 of the prospective fault level.  
          
I>> Pickup 
Set to 22826.5 
       
          
T I>> Time Delay 
        
Set to 0.200 
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Substation 3 Settings 
Relay Type: SIEMENS 7SJ64 
Table 7: Fault Levels at Substation 3 
3 Phase Fault Current on 
420V 
25.495 kA 
 
1 Phase Fault Current on 
420V 
9.217 kA 
 
Full Load Current 1.487 kA  
 
Table 8: Actual Settings applied to the relay at substation 3 
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (IDMT Ph) 
           
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (IDMT Ph) is used for single-phase, 
two-phase and three-phase non-directional overcurrent and short-circuit protection.  
           
The (IDMT Ph) non-directional overcurrent protection shall be set to 105% to 120% of the 
full load current. 
           
Ip 
Pickup 
          
Set to 1.120 
  
 
     
           
T IEp Time Dial 
Set to 0.080 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
        
Trip 
Time 
          
Set to 0.205 seconds 
      
PS 
TM 
FLC 
 Page | 40  
 
           
IEC 
Curve 
Set to Normal Inverse 
        
           
           
           
Three-phase non-directional overcurrent protection: Instantaneous stage (DMT Ph) 
 
  
        
Three Phase Non-directional Overcurrent Protection (DMT Ph) is used for single-phase, 
two-phase and three-phase non-directional overcurrent and short-circuit protection. The 
instantaneous stage (DMT Ph) always operates with the DT characteristic. 
           
This overcurrent protection shall be set to < 0,5 of the prospective fault level.  
 
           
I>> Pickup 
Set to 12747.500 
        
           
T I>> Time Delay 
         
Set to 0.050 
        
           
 
3.4  Discussion of Results: Fault Levels and Characteristic Curves 
When using the bottom up approach in determining the IDMT as well as the I>> overcurrent 
trip settings for the network in figure 15, Substation 03 is the starting point. This is represented 
by the bottom curve (blue) in figure 16.  The IDMT curves grading is acceptable, that is about 
0.2 seconds when judging from the 1000 A, however, the I>> that was calculated based on the 
full load current results Substation 1 and Substation 2 having very similar operating currents.  
They operate at 22126 and 22826 respectively. 
These are within 3% of each other and within the CT allowable error, typically for the 
protection class 5P10 and 10P10 that are 5% and 10% allowable error respectively.  In this 
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scenario any one of the two Substation 1 or 2 will trip for a fault of around 2500 A at the 
furthest end (Substation 3).  This is a reality as depicted in figure 16, the two vertical parts of 
the curves for Substation 1 and 2. 
In the case of IDMT overcurrent, grading margin can be manually factored into the trip time 
formula (11) in section 1.5.  However, the instantaneous setting cannot be compromised.  That 
is why substation 1 instantaneous element will operate faster than Substation 2 (although 
marginally so). 
The instantaneous setting will not be compromised for the following reasons: 
a) If the fault is sustained a moment longer, we risk damaging the equipment, according 
to the relationship: 
Energy = Power x time  
b) There is a limit to the fault that the equipment can be subjected to due to ratings of 
equipment, hence the current setting cannot be increased as it may end up exceeding 
the short time rating (STC) of the equipment. 
As indicated in the settings in section 3.3 and depicted in figure 16, the high set or definite 
time settings are based on the highest fault current at the substation.  It was intended not to 
exceed half of the fault level.  The trip times selected for the high set is 0.2 for substation 2 
and 3, and 0.05 for substation 3.  These can be selected arbitrarily, but in our decision we have 
taken cognisance of the equipment ratings, cable ratings and maximum load at the substations. 
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    Primary Current [A] 
Figure 16: Grading Curves depicting both IDMT and Definite Time O/C 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
It can be seen that with definite time, it is difficult to distinguish between a fault at one point 
or another.  Therefore, discrimination is poor when this type of protection is applied, hence 
the preference is IDMT overcurrent when selectivity is of importance.  
Substation 01 
Substation 03 
Substation 02 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY 2: THREE PHASE BOLTED FAULT IN 
A MESH NETWORK 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter addresses the fundamental problem of a three-phase bolted fault where there is 
no directional element, that is the basic IEEE 37.2 device 50 [22]. The problem that arises 
when there is bi-directional flow of power.  This is a typical scenario that happens in a micro-
grid where there is a traditional utility network and a distributed generation (DG) in the form 
of either PV or any other renewable form of generation.  The neutral earthing method applied 
to the built network in the simulator is solid earthing. 
 
4.2 Experiment Setup 
This study is based on an existing power network whereby generation, represented in the 
network as external network at 132 kV level, and a DG both supply the network.  The purpose 
of the study is to determine the logic input to the relay at the customer level that will minimise 
interruption in the event of a three-phase bolted fault.  A mesh network is considered and built 
into a power simulator, Powerfactory 2018.  The flow of power in this network is therefore bi-
directional and the objective of protection setting for the relays at the consumer point is to 
prevent unnecessary interruptions.   
Similar networks can be found in the sugar industry where the concept of bagasse cogeneration 
is applied; bagasse is burnt and used to generate power [82]. Other similar industries do follow 
a similar arrangement where power generation is performed at consumer point using gas 
generation, a pyrolysis process, wind power, hydropower, biomass and/or solar photo voltaic 
[83] [84].  Similarly, PV generation is becoming popular and, in such a network, it is difficult 
to achieve protection selectivity due to the bi-directional flow of power introduced by the 
presence of DG.  Due to the voltage levels in the distribution network and for the purpose of 
voltage regulation, there are transformers in the renewable plant.  This is an important factor 
because it contributes to the increase in fault levels.  Earthing is maintained consistently as 
solid neutral earthing. 
Bi-directional flow of power as depicted in Figure 17 brings about the discrimination 
problem.  This is resolved with the direct application of directional overcurrent (device 67).  
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In sub B, relay R2 and R3 compete for fault F1 and F2, whereas they should operate 
respectively for F1 and F2 exclusively.  This ensures that at sub B, supply to the user is 
secured. 
 
Figure 17: The discrimination problem in a series network. 
A further problem is when there is a mesh network as in Figure 18.  There are parallel paths 
for power flow and our simplified objective is to ensure that for a fault F1 as in Figure 18, only 
R2 and R3 relays should operate. R1, R2, R3 and R4 are the overcurrent relays in the respective 
zones as per figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Discrimination problem in a mesh network [85] 
 
It is essential to monitor the state of the plant, when it is online and out of service, and apply 
that information as input to the IED.  This can be used to dynamically change settings groups 
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with the IED.  The settings group change will result in the relay becoming directional or non-
directional as required to achieve proper selectivity in fault isolation.  
In Figure 19, the same network can be used to illustrate another point, the different modes of 
operation of a DG.  These are: 
a) Grid connected, R1, R2 and R3 closed.  This is when the voltage and frequency control 
are dependent on the grid. 
b) Autonomous/ Islanded operation R1 and R2 circuit breakers (CB) closed, R3 CB open.  
Independent control of voltage and frequency.  This is necessary when the grid is 
unstable or has a fault.  
c) On test, R3 CB open. 
 
 
Figure 19: Inclusion of DG in a mesh network 
The circuit elements is figure 19 are as follows: 
R1, R2 and R3 – Relays 
A – Utility network, 
G – Distributed Generator. 
The objective of the experiment is to operate in the DG in autonomous mode when a fault, F1 
in figure 19, occurs in the utility network.  This requires R1 and R2 relays to operate as a 
device 67 when DG is out of circuit and migrate to device 50 settings when DG is in circuit. 
The network used in this experiment is shown in Figure 20.  It is a mesh network supplied 
from the traditional power grid and consists of a renewable source.  This network has all the 
necessary features for the discussion of a three phase bolted fault in a micro-grid system. 
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Figure 20: Network used in the experiment 
The parameters of the network are as shown in Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
??? 
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Table 9: Network Parameters 
 
Length 
[m] Z1 [Ὠ] phi Z1 (deg) Z0 [Ὠ] 
PS-Substation 
A 20 6.37 72.991 26.603 
Substation A – 
Substation B 30 10.223 74.009 35.046 
Substation B – 
Substation C 80 25.481 72.991 106.414 
Substation C – 
Substation D 34.29 10.922 72.991 45.612 
Substation D – 
Substation E 29 9.882 74.009 33.878 
Substation E – 
Substation A 14.7 4.682 72.991 19.563 
The relay settings and current transformers (CT) Ratios, re-engineered for proper co-ordination, are shown in 
Table 10 and 11. 
Table 10: CT Ratio, VT Ratio and Relay Type 
Protection Type Overcurrent 
Current Transformer (CT) Ratio 500/1 
Voltage Transformer (VT) Ratio 132000/110 V 
Relay Type ABB REF 615 
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Table 11: Settings for Incomer to each substation 
Substation PS TM GroupSettings 
Matimba 0.5 0.346 N/A 
Substation A 
0.5 
0.111 
Group 1: Non-Directional, 
Group 2: Directional 
Substation B 
0.5 
0.089 
Group 1: Non-Directional, 
Group 2: Directional 
Substation C 
0.5 
0.05 
Group 1: Non-Directional, 
Group 2: Directional 
 
4.3  System Modelling 
IDMT O/C is an inverse time overcurrent protection.  For the calculations of the trip times in 
the Root Mean Square (RMS) simulations, the line parameters in the preceding section were 
used.  The trip time for an International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Standard Inverse 
(SI) characteristic is given by (13). 
 
Required Trip Time=
0.14×Time Multiplier
((
Fault Current 
Plug Setting*Ct Ratio
)
0.02
-1)
      (13) 
 
Plug Setting Multiplier (PSM) = 
Fault Current 
FLC*p.u
= 
Fault Current 
Plug Setting*Ct Ratio
   (14) 
Therefore:  
Required Trip Time=
0.14×Time Multiplier
((
Fault Current 
Plug Setting*Ct Ratio
)
0.02
-1)
       (15) 
Using the definition of PSM in equation (3), we get: 
     Required Trip Time=
0.14×Time Multiplier
((
Fault Current 
FLC*p.u
)
0.02
-1)
      (16) 
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Where: 
FLC = Full load current 
p.u = the multiple of full load current for which protection is intended. 
CT Ratio = Current Transformer Ratio. 
Equation (14), (15) and (16) are applied calculate the trip times and ensure a good grading 
margin is achieved in a series network. 
 
4.4  Fault Simulations Under Steady State 
In this analysis, a load flow is performed, followed by fault simulations.  The objectives are 
the following: 
a) To prove that the relays are properly graded both in time and current through time 
curves; 
b) To determine the relay trip times based on the network parameters used; and 
c) To compare the simulated trip times to the required setting trip times. 
Figure 21 shows the relay operating curves for steady state analysis using the parameters in 
Table 11 for the network in figure 20.  For a fault of 1218.959 Amperes depicted by a blue 
vertical line, Substation C, the furthest substation from the power generation source, trips at 
0.386 seconds, substation B trips at 0.976 seconds and Substation A at 1.655 seconds. This 
shows a good grading margin of 0.59 and 0.679 seconds respectively.  Similarly for a larger 
fault of 2927.77 Amperes, depicted by a red line in figure 21, grading is expressly clear 
between the different substations. 
Once these were ascertained with satisfaction, the next step was to do the dynamic analysis. 
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Figure 21: Time graded curves for dynamic simulations 
4.5 Dynamic Analysis 
A dynamic RMS 3 phase fault was simulated at the end of the feeder to determine which circuit 
breaker operates first to isolate the fault. The objective is to prove the coordination between 
the different circuit breakers in the network.  The main focus is to prove the correct tripping 
in the meshed network under the two conditions, with the DG in network and with DG out of 
the network.  This is proven with group 1 settings, non-directional. 
The simulation is repeated with group 2 settings, directional and the result is that the relays 
close to the fault did not operate as purposed to ensure continuity of supply to substation C 
from renewable source at C.  A carrier signal will instantaneously be sent to the feeder breakers 
to Substation C (C-D and B-C) to open as a precaution to prevent the renewable supplying to 
the fault.  In that way the load is sustained through the renewables.  Once an investigation has 
been done and the fault has been cleared, the system can be brought back to normal operation. 
Migration between the two groups of protection settings is achieved through logic inputs to 
the IED relays.  This is provided for in the marshalling of the relays configured for this 
network, the ABB REF 615 relay. 
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Table 12: Logic Inputs to the relay Sub C incomer 
Incomer Renewable 
Source 
Group 1 Settings Group 2 Settings 
PS supply breaker X 1 0 
Substation A 1 1 0 
Substation A 0 0 1 
Substation B 1 1 0 
Substation B 0 0 1 
Substation C 1 1 0 
Substation C 0 0 1 
 
4.6 Discussion of Results 
The results clearly show that there is sufficient coordination for a fault on the feeders as shown 
in Figure 22.  The feeder with the applied overcurrent settings trips the relay in 1.069 seconds 
on a fault of 7 kA. All the other downstream relays do not see the fault as group 2 settings are 
in operation. It can also be seen from the dynamic time domain simulation that the circuit 
breaker contacts isolate the fault as expected in 1.069 seconds.  The time could not be exactly 
1.2 seconds to the setting range that does not allow a time multiplier of less 0.05. It can be 
noted that for a fault higher than 7 kA, the grading margin of, typically 0.4 seconds, is flouted; 
therefore, the decision to use group 2 settings makes sense. A fault current 7 kA is the three-
phase fault current at substation C that takes into account the contribution of DG to the fault 
levels. 
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Figure 22: Time graded curves for dynamic simulations 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
It has been shown that proper coordination of protection tripping can be achieved, firstly with 
control of protection settings by centralising the function for proper management.  This ensures 
that each substation or busbar setting is not calculated in isolation, but the grading information 
is taken into account.  Secondly, when there is unidirectional power flow, the applied O/C 
settings must be directional, operating for a fault in the opposite direction to the power flow. 
This results in a quicker isolation of fault [52]. 
The relay trip logic should be in such a way as to consider factors relating to a fault at the 
furthest end of the network. When DG or embedded generation (especially PV generation) is 
connected at the consumption end of the network, it is necessary to isolate embedded 
generation from the network completely because of its combustibility nature of PV plant, 
hence the application of non-directional O/C to trip upstream breaker (Power Station) at 1.069 
s in this experiment.  
The selection of settings group and migration from one group to another is achieved through 
the correct marshalling of logic input to the IED.  
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY 3: OVERCURRENT 
PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY USING MICROPROCESSOR 
BASED RELAYS FOR SLG FAULT 
 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter discusses a solution to the protection problem that arises during an SLG fault, 
whereby the two phases that are not faulted tend to misjudge the direction of overcurrent fault 
resulting in an incorrect relaying decision.  The problem is resolved by using other techniques 
in addition to mere application of directional overcurrent quadrature method. 
An incorrect relaying decision leads to improper discrimination and loss of service to sections 
of the network that are otherwise not affected.  The proposed microprocessor based relaying 
solution is devised, as presented in this chapter, whereby the microprocessor relay is 
marshalled for reliable operation under SLG fault conditions and for sensitivity to the direction 
of power flow.  The solution prevents possible mal-operation of protection and ensures 
accurate selectivity. 
 
5.2 System Modelling  
Most of the high-voltage distribution lines in South Africa are part of the interconnected grid.  
These are modelled, for practical purposes, as a series of nodes or substations with power 
sources on either end.  In the application of directional overcurrent protection, the power 
distribution networks have a myriad of relay types in all relay generations, that is, 
electromechanical, solid state and microprocessor based.  It is worth mentioning here that the 
older generations of relays do offer the directional overcurrent function, although with limited 
capabilities.  Protective relaying decisions are critical because proper selectivity could mean 
the difference between productivity and loss thereof.  A philosophy is outlined, whereby 
microprocessor based solutions are applied in order to achieve proper discrimination [37, 40]. 
Decision making is a a result of intelligence that is built into the device. The earlier generation 
of CDG series of relays, for example, operates for an overcurrent and has no built-in 
intelligence to decide if the direction of overcurrent warrants the action of sending a trip signal 
to the circuit breaker.  The Disc Type Directional IDMT Overcurrent & Earth Fault Relay 
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Model: CDD21/31/41, however, was designed to distinguish between the directions of current 
flow. [85] This relay still lacks some intelligence though.  Further developments to the newer 
microprocessor based Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), such as the ABB REF615, can be 
marshalled to make intelligent decision [86]. 
With the misty weather conditions in some areas of South Africa, the SLG faults are prevalent.  
These are transient faults and the action taken by protection is to trip the faulted phase and 
reclose instead of interrupting all the phases [87].  It is therefore important to handle this type 
of fault.  The fault was applied in the A-phase, but it must be noted that what applies in the A-
phase equally applies to the other two phases [75]. 
The type of distribution substations in the selected network are primary substations, as these 
serve as load centres from which the customer substations connect. The design concept is 
referred to as the ‘N-1’ reliability network, a ‘safety net’ reliability standard for the core grid.  
In such a network, a single component failure is not supposed to affect the electricity supply 
[88] [89]. 
It is on this premise that this case study is formulated.  The objective is to ensure that incorrect 
protection operations are avoided.  The objective is to prevent a breaker operation for an SLG 
fault in the reverse direction in A-phase, not to mention to have an effect on the B- and C-
phases. 
 
5.3  Experiment Setup 
Maximum Torque Angle (MTA) 
A phase relationship between voltage and current is used to determine the direction of current 
flow. In the event of an overcurrent fault, the direction of current flow can be determined by 
the phase relationship between phase voltage VA and phase current IA; however, during a fault 
on the A-phase, VA collapses, hence the choice of a voltage that is independent of A as a 
polarising component.  That voltage is the quadrature voltage VBC.  Similarly, IB is polarised 
by VCA and IC by VAB [76]. 
The angle by which current applied to the relay must be displaced from the voltage applied in 
order to produce maximum torque is referred to as maximum torque angle (MTA) [62]. 
In this experiment the MTA of 0° is applied. 
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Tripping Logic 
A deductive analysis method was applied, beginning from the top event of interest. [87] The 
top event is the desired outcome. In this case, it is to allow only the correct “trip decision”.  This 
is achieved by applying the relay logic as shown in Figure 23. 
A fault condition must exist, that is, phase overcurrent event 3.  The phase current must exceed 
the pick-up setting.  Event 5 is the polarising component as contemplated above.  The polarising 
component voltage, the voltage collapse, event 4 and the supervision line-to-line current in 
event 6 should all be 1, for the decision in the top event 1 to be a “true” or 1. 
The breaker pole under investigation is pole B, which must block the trip for a reverse fault in 
phase A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 6, the line-to-line current magnitude, must be in the same direction as the fault current. 
This input is necessary to ensure that, indeed, the fault is in the forward direction and this is the 
solution to the protection problem at hand – misjudgement of direction. 
 
5.4  Experiment Setup 
The network under consideration has generation on the two ends.  The generator specification 
is as follows: 
S = 940 MVA; 
P = 846 MW at power factor of 0.9 leading; 
The generators are solidly earthed. 
Figure 23:Microprocessor Relay Tripping Logic 
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A single line to ground fault is simulated at about 50% of the length of Sub C to Sub D line as 
indicated in Figure 24.  The protection under consideration is at Sub C on the Sub B feeder and 
the relay is set for directional phase overcurrent.  The overcurrent pick-up and the MTA settings 
are applied. 
The significance of the term MTA as the torque angle has diminished due to the capabilities of 
the latter electromechanical relays to have phase shifting components to produce maximum 
torque at the applied angle.  Modern microprocessor based relays can accept any angle ranging 
from -90° to +90°  [76]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this experiment, an angle of 0° is applied as a setting to a relay in order to demonstrate the 
protection problem under investigation.  Any relay that has directional component can be used 
to demonstrate the protection problem, although the solution devised here can only be applied 
in IEDs. 
The network considered for this discussion is a 132 kV network with four substations in series.  
Either side of the network is a series of substations leading to power generation in a ring 
formation as shown in Figure 24. 
A 132 kV transmission is generally done via overhead lines and it is suitable for this study as 
the SLG faults are more prevalent in overhead lines.  These faults are generally of a transient 
nature and therefore it makes sense to trip the single faulted phase and reclose [19, 21, 52]. 
Figure 24: The network under discussion 
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5.5  Discussion of Results 
Network Simulation  
The network was built into a power simulator and the relevant data was extracted and presented 
as Table 13.   
Figures 25 and 26 show the resultant currents and voltages as measured by the relay. 
Table 13: Experimental results 
Measured 
Quantity 
Parameter Measurements 
Red 
Phase 
White 
Phase 
Blue Phase 
Voltages at 
Sub B 
Phase 
Voltage 
0° 96.83 kV 103.79 kV 
Phase angle 0° -135.7° 131.43° 
Currents at 
Sub B 
Line 
Currents 
1.84 kA 0.17 kA 0.20 kA 
Phase Angle 108.92° -64.38° -63.74° 
 
Figure 25: Line currents during the SLG Fault 
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Figure 26: Line voltages during fault 
 
The voltage VA is the phase voltage as measured by the instruments at B looking in the direction 
of C.  Therefore, the current angles are offset by an 180° when looking at substation C feeder 
B.  Hence the angles are as depicted in the phasor diagrams in Figures 27, 28 and 29 for the A, 
B and C - phases respectively. 
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The phasors of interest will therefore be: 
IA = 1.84 kA ∟ -72° 
IB = 0.17 kA ∟115.62° 
IC = 0.20 kA ∟116.26°   and 
V’AB = 96.83 kV ∟44.3° 
V’BC = 138.35 kV ∟175.78° 
V’CA = 103.79 kV ∟131.43° 
The nominal voltages are as follows: 
VAB = 132 kV ∟30° 
VBC = 132 kV ∟-90° 
VCA = 132 kV ∟150° 
 
Protection Problem 
When an SLG fault occurs, there is an effect on the faulted phase, phase A (Scenario A) and 
the other two phases, B and C (Scenario B). 
Figures 28 and 29 show that for the reverse phase A SLG fault, the B and C phase directional 
elements at Sub C on the Sub B feeder will make an incorrect forward decision.  In the event 
that the phase currents in phases B and C are higher than the pick-up current settings, an 
overcurrent trip will be initiated.   
Scenario A 
The normal line voltage for the system in this study is 132 kV, and it can be noted that the 
faulted phase voltage collapses to about to 0 V.   
Phase A experienced an overcurrent condition, a phase voltage collapse, the polarising 
component in the reverse direction and a high supervision line current; therefore, the trip is 
blocked, as shown in Figures 27 and Table 14. The only input that is not active (0) is the 
polarising component which happens to be in the opposite direction to the phase current.  
Phase A experienced a voltage collapse. The A-phase voltage does not always drop to 0 V 
considering a possibility of an existence of a fault impedance in the event of an arc to earth or 
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a lack or direct connectivity to earth.  This has no significance in the settings determination for 
voltage collapse. 
In this experiment, it is observed that all phase currents are in the forward direction.  However, 
only A has the polarising component (VBC) in the opposite direction.  This results in a correct 
decision to block the trip in A phase.  In this case, the line-to-line current supervision does not 
matter as the decision is as expected.  
In this scenario, the line-to-line supervision is in the same direction as the current IA (or a logic 
1), but this only indicates that there is a fault in the phase but obviously the decision, based on 
the direction of the fault, is a “block” and not a “trip”. 
The phase shift from the steady state to the transient state, as can be seen in the phasor diagrams, 
is based on the charging of the two healthy phase capacitances and the discharging of the faulty 
A-phase capacitance. This is evident when comparing the voltages VAB, VCA, VBC against VAB’, 
VCA’ and VBC’ respectively. 
 
Figure 27: A-phase current during fault at MTA = 0° 
Scenario B 
The B and C  phases experienced a dip less than 25%, therefore a setting of less than 75% (90 
kV), 50% of nominal voltage should suffice as a setting for voltage collapse (event number 4 
in Figure 23).   
Phase B and C experienced possible overcurrent, depending on the pick-up setting, possible 
voltage collapse (the 50% or more depending on the severity of the fault dip –  as stated above), 
the polarising component is in the same direction as the phase currents but (Figures 28 and 29) 
and the direction of the supervision is opposite (logic 0).   
 
VBC 
IA 
V’BC 
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The overcurrent trip for phases B and C was initiated at Sub C, the fault condition, that is, event 
3, but due to the opposing of the supervision line-to-line current, the trip is inhibited (result = 0 
in the logic table). 
Figures 28 and 29 show that B and C phases appear to be in the forward direction, the same 
direction as the polarising component.  Therefore, if IB and IC are above the pick-up value, the 
two phases will make an incorrect decision resulting in the isolation of feeder B at substation 
C.   
 
Figure 28: B-phase current during a fault at MTA = 0° 
 
Figure 29: C-phase current during a fault at MTA =0° 
The line-to-line currents as shown in the next section proved very useful as inputs to the logic 
in Figure 23, for supervision, in order to make the correct “tripping” decision.  The truth table, 
Table 14, shows the applied logic with the trip decision for all three phases. 
 
VCA 
IB 
V’CA 
 
VAB 
IC 
V’AB 
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Table 14: Truth table for tripping decisions. 
Breaker 
Pole 
Tripping 
Decisions 
Parameter Phase 
Red 
Phase 
White 
Phase 
Blue Phase 
Voltages 
at Sub B 
I>> 1 0 0 
Phase 
Voltage 
Collapse 
1 Don’t Care Don’t Care 
Polarising 
Component  
0 1 1 
Supervision 
– Line to 
line Current  
IB-IC IC-IA IA-IB 
1 0 0 
Trip 
Decision 
 0 0 0 
 
Supervision Line-to-line Current 
Supervision by using line-to-line current yields the desired results.  The A, B and C phases are 
supervised respectively with IB – IC, IC-IA and IA-IB. 
The actual figures for all line-to-line currents are as follows: 
IB-IC  =  0.17 kA ∟115.62° – 0.20 kA ∟116.26°    = 30.07 ∟300° This is in the same direction 
as IA – Logic 1. 
IC-IA = 0.20 kA ∟116.26° – 1.84 kA ∟ -72° = 2.04 kA ∟109° This is in the opposite direction 
to IB – Logic 0. 
IA-IB = 1.84 kA ∟ -72°  – 0.17 kA ∟115.62° = 2.0 kA ∟288° This is in the opposite direction 
to IC – Logic 0. 
From these computations, it can be deduced that the supervision component for phase A will 
result in a logic of 1 due to the current direction; however, the B and C phases (or white and 
blue phases) supervision currents are in the opposing direction.  
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The line-to-line currents are the phasor difference between the currents, that is, IB-IC, IC-IA for 
IB and IA-IB for IA, IB and IC respectively.  The white and blue phases would have otherwise 
tripped had there been no line-to-line current supervision. 
Now since the breaker at Sub C looking towards Sub B is blocked from tripping, the correct 
breaker at C (looking towards D) will trip and isolate the fault and the supply from B to C will 
be maintained. 
Table 14 indicates that the trip decision is 0 (or block) when the logic is applied to the B- and 
C-phases (White and Blue).  The B- and C- phases will block due to the line-to-line current 
being in the opposite direction.  This logic is applied only to microprocessor based relays. 
The thresholds for the both voltage and current settings need to be selected with great caution.   
The microprocessor based relays are a revolutionary innovation in the field of Electrical 
Protection as they bring with them the flexibility to customise the protection philosophy.  
Practitioners in the power system have a responsibility to standardise philosophies for ease of 
maintenance. 
 
5.6  Conclusion 
The incorrect judgement of direction of current flow by B- and C-phases in the event of an A-
phase was prevented by applying the logic in the flow diagram above.  Event 4, voltage 
collapse, has no bearing on the decision in the case of phases B and C. Current supervision in 
event 6 in the tripping logic flow diagram is key to the decision to block the trip in the event of 
an SLG on the red phase. 
The experiment proved that, with the older generation of relays, there is a shortcoming as the 
SLG fault can result in incorrect isolation.  A philosophy that has a supervision logic ensures 
that the relay decisions are kept in check in order to prevent nuisance disconnections. 
The philosophy was applied to a numerical relay type ABB REF615, which was able to provide 
reliable operation in the event of reverse direction overcurrent faults, even when the overcurrent 
pickup was set low.  A-phase did not operate for a reverse fault and B- and C-phases also 
blocked the trip due to the applied logic that ensures that there is “supervision” input to the trip 
logic of the relay. 
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This philosophy enhances security of supply by eliminating nuisance incorrect operation of 
protection and selectively operating for faults only in the protected zone.    
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1  Conclusions 
IDMT O/C protection meets the performance and design criteria for system protection devices 
of: 
a) Being Cheap, 
b) Simplicity - Ease of implementation and maintenance, 
c) Operating with selectivity, and 
d) Operating reliably, that is dependably and with security. 
Based on the experiments conducted on the application of IDMT overcurrent in a micro-grid 
system, the outcomes yielded the following: 
a) In all practicality and realism, time-graded overcurrent protection is a legendary form 
of protection, has stood the test of time and it finds its application to be more reliable 
in ensuring coordination of tripping.  It has proven to ease the way into selective 
operation of protective devices, hence it provides dependability and security of supply.  
In Chapter 3 superiority of IDMT O/C over other types of overcurrent was illustrated. 
b) The most severe fault is a three-phase bolted fault.  The objective for selective 
operation is to ensure that when a fault occurs, IED protective devices operate with 
flawless selectivity and leave as much of the network as possible unaffected.  This 
requires selectivity beyond the usual series coordination.  In a mesh network, a 
directional element is essential to ensure that the unaffected parts maintain supply to 
the load.  This is the essence of a micro-grid as illustrated in the case study in Chapter 
4. 
c) In the event of an SLG fault, the most common of all short circuit faults, an incorrect 
decision by the relay, can be costly if it results in the isolation of unaffected parts of 
the network.  More importantly, at the Extra High Voltage levels (EHV) and some high 
voltage levels that transmit using overhead lines, the prevalence of SLG faults requires 
clever logic and accurate decisions by the IED protective devices.  A logic input is 
devised in the Chapter 5 case study to aid in the correct decision making. 
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The results of the experiments can be summarised as follows: 
Table 15: Experiments Results Summary 
Experiment 
Number 
Objective/ Hypothesis Case Solution 
1 IDMT Overcurrent offers 
better coordination of 
protection tripping than 
instantaneous 
overcurrent. 
A series circuit 
supplying air 
conditioning at a 
power station. 
When applying a 
consistent approach into 
settings calculations.  
Instantaneous O/C, based 
on the fault levels fails to 
coordinate while IDMT 
generally coordinates and 
offer perfect grading 
between series nodes. 
2 In a 3 phase bolted fault, 
selectivity fails when 
there is a bidirectional 
flow of current. 
A 132 kV 
network supplied 
from a power 
generation 
station and 
having a DG. 
The application of 
directional and non-
directional overcurrent 
protection based on the 
logic input of breaker 
statuses.  A seamless 
migration between the 
different settings groups 
makes it possible to 
isolate the faulted section 
selectively while ensuring 
that the unaffected areas 
are not interrupted. 
3 An incorrect directional 
decision made by the 
relay on power flow 
direction of the 
unaffected phases. 
A 132 kV 
transmission 
network with 
bidirectional 
flow of power. 
The traditional quadrature 
method is insufficient and  
correct judgement is 
achieved by applying line 
current supervision. 
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6.2  Recommendations 
Standardisation of electrical protection philosophies is suggested, whereby the utility operator 
will device standard relay tripping logic for each of the possible scenarios.  These should aim 
at minimising incorrect breaker tripping operations as this can be costly to both the utility 
operator and the power user.  
Further studies need to be pursued in the field of electrical protection, with the aim of taking 
advantage of the new capabilities offered by the IED devices, the enhanced features of the 
IEC61850 Generic Objective Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messaging and other 
features necessary for a fully-fledged micro-grid system. 
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